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CHECK YOUR PRIVACY RIGHTS AT THE FRONT GATE:
CONSENSUAL SODOMY REGULATION IN TODAYS MILITARY
FOLLOWING UNITED STATES v. MARCUM
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Marcum, l the latest judicial interpretation of the
military's sodomy statute,2 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces3
created a delicate balance between seIVicemembers' privacy rights and
Congress's right to regulate the military.4 While limiting the Supreme
Court's privacy protections articulated in Lawrence v. Texas 5 in the military context, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces crafted a new
rule in which military members are now required to apply a multi-part
test to determine if their conduct is protected. 6 The resulting environment is one in which seIVicemembers may not be precisely sure
whether their private, consensual, sexual conduct is proscribed. 7
Upon closer examination, however, one need only look to the legitimacy of the underlying relationship-in the eyes of the military-to
determine whether the sexual conduct will be criminal and
prosecutable. 8
The Uniform Code of Military Justice codifies the military's sodomy
statute in Article 125, which states:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in
unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same
1. 60 MJ. 198 (CAA.F. 2004).
2. See 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000).
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is the military's
highest appellate court, one level below the United States Supreme Court,
and it has jurisdiction over servicemembers throughout the world. CLERK
OF THE COURT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED
FORCES 1, available at http://www.armfoLuscourts.gov/CAAFBooklet.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1,2005). The court was established as an Article I court by
Congress. [d. Its judges serve fifteen year terms and are civilians. [d. at 8.
To emphasize the civilian makeup of the court, Congress expressly stated
that retired military members were to be excluded from appointment to
the court. [d. Additionally, prior to 1994, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces was known as the Court of Military Appeals. [d. at 3. For
clarity, this comment uses the name Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
for all cases decided by the court.
4. See infra Part V.C.
5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Texas's sodomy statute which prohibited
same-sex sodomy on the grounds the law violated the Due Process clause).
6. See infra Part IV.D.; Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205.
7. See infra Part VA
S. See infra Part V.C.
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or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense.
(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in
United States v. Marcum has changed the scope, meaning, and understanding of Article 125 by creating a multi-part test to analyze sodomy
cases. IO In creating the test, the court has followed the less than clear
guidance of the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision and created a constitutional, albeit cumbersome, standard for those in the military. I I
This comment will analyze the scope of the constitutional right to
privacy as it is applied in the military context and explore the limits of
the military's sodomy statute in light of the new test (hereinafter
called the "Marcum Test") .12 This comment will first address the history of sodomy statutes. Then, it will parse the Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas, the liberty right it created, and how the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces' recent holding in United States v.
Marcum interprets that right in a military setting. Next, this comment
will evaluate the constitutionality of the Marcum Test in the military
and how the Marcum decision applies to military personnel today. Finally, this comment will suggest alternatives to criminally charging servicemembers for engaging in consensual sodomy.

II.

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF SODOMY STATUTES

A.

Origins of Statutes Proscribing Sodomy

The origin of sodomy laws in society stems from biblical interpretations of Genesis 19:4-11 from the Old Testament. I3 Based on the story
9. 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000).
10. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205.
11. See infra Part V.C.
12. See infra Part IV.D.
13. JOHN J. McNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE HOMOSEXUAL 42-43 (Beacon Press
1993); see also ROLAND A. BRINKLEY, JR. ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE MONOGRAPH VOL. II, No.4: THE LAws AGAINST HOMOSEXUALI1Y 11 (Inst. of Contemp. Corr. & the Behav. Sci., Sam Houston State Univ., Tex.) (n.d.); MARK
D.JORDAN, THE SILENCE OF SODOM 121 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000). The
biblical verse is:
But before they lay down, the men of the city, the men of Sodom,
both young and old, all the people to the last man, surrounded the
house; 5. and they called to Lot, "Where are the men who came to
you tonight? Bring them out to us, that we may know them." 6. Lot
went out of the door to the men, shut the door after him, 7. and
said, "I beg you, my brothers, do not act so wickedly. 8. Behold, I
have two daughters who have not known man; let me bring them
out to you, and do to them as you please; only do nothing to these
men, for they have come under the shelter of my roof." 9. But
they said, "Stand back!" And they said, "This fellow came to sojourn, and he would play the judge! Now we will deal worse with
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of Sodom and Gomorrah, early Church teachings focused on God's
vengeance upon the two cities for wide-spread homosexual activities. 14
It was also taught that these" 'offenses against nature'" were the cause
of a number of natural disasters and other catastrophes. 15 Additionally, church leaders argued that God had given humans the ability to
engage in sexual relations for the sole purpose of procreation. 16
To protect themselves from these curses and to promote procreativity, societies, through both civil and Church law, outlawed sodomy.17
The crime was often described as, "that detestable and abominable
crime (among Christians not to be named) .... "18 This view of sodomy carried into England 19 and eventually flowed to America. 20

14.

15.
16.

17.

18.

19.
20.

you than with them." Then they pressed hard against the man Lot,
and drew near to break the door. 10. But the men put forth their
hands and brought Lot into the house to them, and shut the door.
11. And they struck with blindness the men who were at the door
of the house, both small and great, so that they wearied themselves
groping for the door.
Genesis 19:4-11 (King James).
McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42; see also LJ. Boon, Those Damned Sodomites:
Public Images of Sodomy in the Eighteenth Century Netherlands, in THE PURSUIT
OF SODOMY: MALE HOMOSEXUALIl:Y IN RENAISSANCE AND ENLIGHTENMENT
EUROPE 237, 242, 246 (Kent Gerard & Gert Hekma eds., Harrington Park
Press 1989) (discussing the historical view of sodomites pre-1730 in the
Netherlands) .
McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42; see also Boon, supra note 14, at 242.
Richard Green, Sodomy Laws, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SEXOLOGY 35,
35 GamesJ. Krivacska &John Money eds., 1994); see also JAMES W. BUTTON
ET AL., PRIVATE LNEs, PUBLIC CONFLICTS 179 (CQ Press 1997) (describing
religious values as "procreatively-focused sexuality"); cj PAUL R. ABRAMSON
ET AL., SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 75 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2003) (pointing out that an argument could be made that the purpose of sex is to procreate, but concluding
that the argument is "silliness, plain and simple").
McNEILL, supra note 13, at 42. Of interest, McNeill discusses the possible
mistranslation of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. Id. at 42-43. He lays
out an argument, made by some biblical scholars, that the ultimate sin of
"inhospitality" is what delivered God's wrath and not sexual deviancy. Id. at
50. If true, McNeill opines that this would be one of history'S greatest ironies. Id.
JOSEPH CHITTI', 2 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 51 (G. & C.
Merriam, 3d Am. ed. 1836); see also RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B.
SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAws 65 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1996) (stating that early laws containing the language "'crime against nature,' were limited to anal intercourse"). Today, however, this definition
has been commonly expanded to include fellatio, cunnilingus and bestiality. Id.; see also B. ANTHONY MOROSCO, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
SEX CRIMES § 1.02, at 1-5 (Matthew Bender 1976).
Green, supra note 16, at 37; see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65.
Jonathan Ned Katz, The Age of Sodomitical Sin, 1607-1740, in RECLAIMING
SODOM 43, 43-44 Gonathan Goldberg ed., 1994); see also POSNER &
SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65.
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Before Henry VIII's Reformation Acts criminalized sodomy in 1533,
sodomy had only been considered a sin against the church. 21 Mter
1533, however, sodomy, or "buggery" as it was often called, could, for
the first time, be punished in civil courts. 22
This new crime was a felony and its offenders faced death and, interestingly, loss of property.23 There was no exception for clergy who
were usually only subjected to punishment by the church.24 This is
important because it demonstrates, for the first time, a shift in power
from the church to the state and exposes possible ulterior motives of
the Reformation Parliament and Henry VIII.25

B.

Sodomy Statutes Cross the Atlantic

As early as 1641, throughout colonial America, sodomy was a crime
that was punishable by death. 26 The Massachusetts Bay code of 1641
made "man lying with man as with a woman" punishable by death.2'
Even heterosexual sodomy was condemned. 28 The New Haven Law of
1656 "provided death for male-female anal intercourse, incitement to
masturbation, and undefined acts of women 'against nature.' "29 In
the agrarian colonies, procreation was not just God's will, it was
viewed as a form of surviva1. 30 Therefore, the consequences of nonreproductive sexual acts were seen as an economic threat to society.31
21. Katz, supra note 20, at 46-47; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568
(2003); POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65.
22. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 65;
LESLIE]' MORAN, THE HOMOSEXUAL(flY) OF LAw 22 (Routledge 1996).
23. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also PETER ROOK & ROBERT WARD, ROOK &
WARD ON SEXUAL OFFENCES 125 (Sweet & Maxwell 2d ed. 1997).
24. Katz, supra note 20, at 47; see also ROOK & WARD, supra note 23, at 125.
25. Katz, supra note 20, at 47. While not further explored in this comment,
Katz implies Henry VIII's motives were more about separating England
from Roman Catholic rule by the Pope than his concern about sodomy. Id.
at 46-47. In 1536, relying on this new law, Henry VIII charged a number of
Catholic monks with this crime and was able to confiscate their monasteries' land and redistribute it. Id.
26. Katz, supra note 20, at 47.
27. Id. It seems ironic that one of the first regions to have an anti-homosexual
statute would also be home to one of the first states to permit same-sex
marriage. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003).
28. Katz, supra note 20, at 48.
29. Id. This phrasing is generally understood to mean women performing oral
sex on men. See DONAL EJ. MAcNAMARA & EDWARD SAGARlN, SEX, CRIME,
AND THE LAw 196-97 (Free Press 1977) (stating that condemnation and
punishment apparently did not deter men and women from engaging in
these acts).
30. Katz, supra note 20, at 44-45. A community required procreation to ensure
it would have adequate labor. Id.
31. Id. at 45; see also ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 16, at 75.
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At the time the Bill of Righ ts was ratified in 1791, sodomy was illegal
in all thirteen original states. 32 By 1868, thirty-two of thirty-seven
states had criminalized sodomy.33 In 1961 every state criminalized
sodomy; in that year Illinois became the first state to repeal its consensual sodomy statute by virtue of adopting the Model Penal Code,
which advocated for repealing consensual sodomy statutes. 34 By 1986,
when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Bowers v. Hardwick,35
almost half of all states and Washington, D.C. still criminalized consensual sodomy.36 Although the laws were largely ignored and not
enforced in most jurisdictions, prosecutions for consensual sodomy
still occurred, albeit rarely.37
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held there was no fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.38 It found
that "[p]roscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,"39 and it
cited a history of sodomy laws in this country dating back to 1791.40
The Georgia statute at issue, which outlawed sodomy, regardless of
whether heterosexual or homosexual, was validated. 41
By the time the Court heard arguments in Lawrence v. Texas,42 in
2003, the number of states outlawing consensual sodomy had decreased by nearly half since Bowers. 43 By virtue of the Court's holding
32. Green, supra note 16, at 38; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 19293 n.5 (1986) (listing states criminalizing sodomy). At least one of the
founding fathers was aware of the criminalization of sodomy. Green, supra
note 16, at 38. Thomas Jefferson apparently did not object to it being a
crime, but did advocate repealing the death penalty for sodomy, preferring
instead castration for sodomy offenders. [d. In 1800, Jefferson's Virginia
replaced its death penalty for sodomy with a sentence of one to ten years in
prison. [d.
33. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93.
34. Green, supra note 16, at 39.
35. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (oral arguments heard March 31, 1986); see also
infra text accompanying notes 38-41 (describing Bowers).
36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193-94; see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGUlATING INTIMACY 94
(Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 198 n.2 (Powell, j., concurring); see also POSNER &
SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 66 (citing the Bowers case); Anne B. Goldstein,
History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, in SEX, MORALITY, AND THE LAw 32, 32 (Lori
Gruen & George E. Panic has eds., 1997) (stating that it took ten hours for a
prosecutor to ultimately decide not to prosecute Hardwick, during which
time Hardwick and his partner were in jail).
38. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
39. [d. at 192.
40. [d. at 192-93 n.5.
41. [d. at 188-89. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984) stated that "[a] person
commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another."
42. 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003) (oral arguments heard March 26, 2003).
43. [d. at 573 (decreasing from twenty-five states in 1986 to thirteen by 2003).

244

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

in Lawrence,44 consensual, noncommercial sodomy between adults is
no longer a crime in any state. 45 Surprisingly, however, there remains
one last jurisdiction in America that still has a consensual sodomy statute: the United States military.46
C.

Sodomy Statutes in the United States Military

The Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") was signed into law
on May 5, 1950,47 and the original sodomy statute articulated therein
has remained virtually unchanged for nearly fifty-five years. 48 The
UCMJ is rooted in military history and has its base in the Articles of
War of 1775,49 which traces its lineage to the British Articles of War of
1749. 50 Although the British Articles of War of 1749 did expressly proscribe sodomy, calling it an "unnatural and detestable sin,"51 with a
sentence of death,52 the United States military, prior to 1920, had no
express sodomy statute. 53 Pre-1920, the crime was charged under Article 96,54 the general article or "catch-all."55 Mter 1920, however, a
prohibition on sodomy was added as a specific statute in the Articles
44. [d. at 578.
45. [d.
46. 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125 (2000); see also United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ.
198, 206 (C.A.AF. 2004).
47. Pub. L. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107 (1950); see also Lieutenant Colonel James B.
Roan & Captain Cynthia Buxton, The American Military justice System in the
New Millennium, 52 AF. L. REv. 185, 187-89 (2002) (discussing the various
factors which lead to the development of the UCMJ).
48. Compare id. at art. 125 (1950) ("Any person subject to this code . ... "), with
10 U.S.C. § 925(a) (2000) ("Any person subject to this chapter . ... ") (emphasis added).
49. JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY JUSTICE 3 (Princeton Univ. Press 1992);
see also Roan & Buxton, supra note 47, at 187.
50. Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military justice, 28
MIL. L. REv. 17, 18 (1965).
51. Articles for War of the Royal Navy § 29 (1749), reprinted in N.A.M. RODGER,
ARTICLES OF WAR, at 27 (Kenneth Mason 1982). The sodomy provision
stated, in full, that" [i]f any person in the fleet shall commit the unnatural
and detestable sin of buggery and sodomy with man or beast, he shall be
punished with death by the sentence of a court-martial." [d.
52. [d.
53. See United States v. Harris, 8 MJ. 52, 53 (C.M.A. 1979); see also Major Eugene E. Baime, Private Consensual Sodomy Should be Constitutionally Protected in
the Military by the Right to Privacy, 171 MIL. L. REv. 91, 94 (2002) (discussing
the development of sodomy laws in the military).
54. Harris, 8 MJ. at 53; see Baime, supra note 53, at 94.
55. Article 96, the General Article of the Articles of War of 1916, provides:
Though not mentioned in these articles, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service,
and all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons subject to
military law may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general
or special or summary court-martial according to the nature and
degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion of such court.
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of War and was later codified in the UCMJ.56 In 1978, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces clearly articulated the scope of Article
125: "[b]y its terms, Article 125 prohibits every kind of unnatural carnal intercourse, whether accomplished by force or fraud, or with consent. Similarly, the article does not distinguish between an act
committed in the privacy of one's home, with no person present other
than the sexual partner.... "57 This prohibition against private, consensual sodomy would eventually set the military apart from the rest of
American jurisdictions. 58
III.

CONSENSUAL SODOMY STATUTES IN AMERICA AFTER
LAWRENCE v. TEXAS

The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas expressly overturned its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which had upheld
states' consensual sodomy statutes. 59 In Lawrence, two men,John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, were convicted of violating the Texas sodomy statute after the police entered their apartment on a supposed
weapons disturbance complaint and discovered the pair "engaging in
a sexual act."60 The case made its way through the Texas appellate
process with courts relying on the Supreme Court's, then authoritative, holding from Bowers. 61
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court determined that Texas's interest in
proscribing the type of consensual, private conduct prohibited by the
statute was neither "legitimate [n] or urgent."62 Relying on history,
the Court noted that provisions outlawing sodomy were rarely enforced "against consenting adults acting in private."63 Additionally,
the Court pointed out that even after Bowers, some states had chosen

56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Federal Possession and Control Act, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 666 (1916);
see also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. WAR OFFICE, A MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, 283, 285-86 (Gov't Printing Office 1917).
Sodomy is specifically referred to under the "Crimes or Offenses not
Capital" section and to be charged under the general article, Article 96. Id.
The proof required was the same as that for "Assault to Commit any Felony" from Article 93. Id. at 252, 286.
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on H.R 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on the Armed Seroices, 81st Congo 1233 (1949) (referring to previous Article of War 93 as reference for breaking-out sodomy as its own statute, Article 125, in the first Uniform Code of Military Justice); see also
Baime, supra note 53, at 94-96.
United States v. Scoby, 5 MJ. 160, 163 (C.MA 1978).
See infra Part III.
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
Id. at 562-63; see also Diana Hassel, National Interest: Lawrence v. Texas:
Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 565, 566
(2004) (reciting the facts from Lawrence).
See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 359-62 (Tex. App. 2001); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
Id. at 569; see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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to abolish sodomy statutes. 64 The Court therefore overruled Bowers,
calling the holding "not correct when it was decided, and . . . not
correct today,"65 and extended a liberty interest to private, consensual
sexual conduct. 66
Although the Supreme Court expressly overruled its Bowers decision
in Lawrence, the implications of the Lawrence decision have been the
subject of much debate. 67 For example, as Justice O'Connor would
point out in her concurrence, the Texas statute, unlike the Georgia
statute in Bowers, only outlawed same sex sodomy.68 This may leave
open a question in the future as to whether a statute forbidding sodomy could be applied equally to all, as the military's sodomy statute is,
and not just between those of the same sex. 69
Adding to the Lawrence debate is the fact the Court, in coming to its
conclusion, did not expressly articulate which constitutional standard
of review it applied. 70 Justice Scalia, in his dissent to Lawrence, characterized it as an "unheard-of form of rational-basis review. "71 Professor
Laurence Tribe, however, argues that the standard of review used was
not "mysterious."72 He states that based on the analytical path the
court followed, covering Griswold v. Connecticut 73 and &e v. Wade,74
64. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
66. Id.; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The ''Fundamental Right"
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1894, 1935-37 (2004).
67. See, e.g., Susan Austin Blazier, The Irrational Use of Rational Basis Review in
Lawrence v. Texas: Implications For Our Society, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 21, 25
(noting the court's implication that any victimless conduct which occurs in
private in one's own home may now be legal); Nan D. Hunter, SexualOrientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 M1CH. L. REv. 1528, 1532-33
(2004) (discussing three types of "antigay" legislation that appellate courts
upheld even after Lawrence to demonstrate the possible limits of Lawrence);
Hassel, supra note 60, at 577 (stating the results of Lawrence are not yet fully
understood) .
68. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003) ("A
person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with
another individual ofthe same sex."). The section title of the sodomy law is
even named "Homosexual Conduct." Id.
69. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Blazier,
supra note 67, at 30 (arguing equal protection is not a valid basis on which
to strike down a gender-neutral sodomy statute).
70. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that petitioners' Due Process rights
were violated without stating which standard of review was applied); see generally Colin Callahan & Amelia Kaufman, Constitutional Law Chapter: Equal
Protection, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 17, 19-28 (2004) (providing an overview of
the standards of review in equal protection analysis). The three levels of
review generally used by the Court are rational basis, heightened scrutiny,
and strict scrutiny. Id. at 22. The higher the level of scrutiny, the more
difficult it becomes for legislation to survive judicial review. Id. at 21. For
example, classifying something as a fundamental right will require strict
scrutiny of any statute that infringes upon the fundamental right. Id. at 19.
71. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Tribe, supra note 66, at 1916-17.
73. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the standard used was "obvious."75 Professor Tribe, by implication,
claims the standard was some sort of heightened scrutiny because the
Court methodically cited the history of personal rights cases and
stated that, "'protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a
substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the
rights of the person.' "76 Regardless, the majority based its decision on
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and provided some privacy protections for adults engaging in
consensual sodomy.77
The Court's constitutional protection of consensual sodomy, however, was not limitless as certain parameters applied: "[ t] he present
case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might
be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or
prostitution. "78
These limits would later become the cornerstone of the Court of
Appeals of the Armed Forces' development of the Marcum Test. 79
IV.

HOW THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
INTERPRETS ARTICLE 125 TODAY: UNITED STATES v.
MARCUM

While Lawrence seemed to provide a far-reaching umbrella of privacy protections, the question of how those rights would be interpreted in a military setting remained unresolved until the appeal of
Air Force Technical Sergeant (E-6) Eric Marcum in 2003. 80 Marcum
was the supervising noncommissioned officer of a flight of intelligence linguists. 81 He developed a variety of close relationships with
his male subordinates and, allegedly, had "sexual encounters" with six
of them. 82 He was charged with violating UCM] Articles 92, 125, and
134, and was ultimately found guilty at court-martial of violating all
three articles and also Article 128. 83
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Tribe, supra note 66, at 1917.
76. [d. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565) (emphases omitted) (alteration
omitted).
77. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
78. [d. at 578.
79. See infra Part IV.D.
80. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 198 (C.AAF. 2004); see generally
Baime, supra note 53 (arguing in a pre-Lawrence article that the right to
privacy in the military was protected, and private, consensual sodomy
should be allowed based on Bowers).
81. [d. at 200.
82. [d.
83. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 2-3, United States v. Eric P.
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.AAF. 2004) (No. 02-0944/ AF) (stating Marcum
was charged with one count of Article 92, failure to obey an order or regulation by providing alcohol to persons under twenty-one, three counts of
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Of importance to this comment, the court-martial found that one of
Marcum's violations of Article 125 was for consensual sodomy and not
the non-consensual sodomy that had been charged. 84 It was this conviction for consensual sodomy which formed one of the bases for Marcum's appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. 85

A.

The Relationship and Act at Issue

This particular conviction stemmed from Marcum's relationship
with Senior Airman (E-4) Robert Harrison, one of Marcum's subordinates. 86 Following a night of drinking, Harrison returned with Marcum to Marcum's apartment,87 where, before going to bed, Harrison
took off all of his clothing with the exception of his boxer shorts and·
T-shirt. 88 He then went to sleep on Marcum's couch and at some
point during the night he awoke to the following: "I looked down and
I was trying to keep my eyes closed because I felt something strange
and I didn't know exactly what was going on but I opened my eyes just
enough to see Sergeant's head over my crotch and I felt his mouth on
my penis. "89
Of importance to the appellate court, Harrison testified that although he said nothing at the time and simply rolled over, the encounter made him "scared, angry, and uncomfortable" and he
confronted Marcum about the incident to ensure, "this sort of thing
d[id]n't ever happen again."90
Highlighting the apparent consensual nature of their relationship,
on cross-examination Harrison admitted that he continued to go out
drinking with Marcum, would spend the night at Marcum's apartment, sent Marcum gifts from his travels, and even told Marcum that

84.
85.

86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

Article 125, sodomy without consent, and five counts of Article 134, general
article to include indecent acts and also convicted of Article 128 for
assault}.
[d. at 2.
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 199-200. Marcum was originally sentenced on May 24,
2000 and none of his subsequent appeals included the consensual sodomy
charge, however, his appeal was pending when Lawrence was decided and
he was ultimately granted a review of this issue as well. See United States v.
Marcum, 59 MJ. 131 (CAA.F. 2003) (granting review of supplemental issue, the consensual sodomy charge, in light of Lawrence); United States v.
Marcum, 58 MJ. 205 (C.AAF. 2003) (granting review of two issues, not
including sodomy); United States v. Marcum, 2002 CCA LEXIS 173 (AF.
Ct. Crim. App. 2002) (affirming sentence while reviewing issues not including consensual sodomy charge).
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200; Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 4,
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No. 02-0944/AF).
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200.
Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 4, Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No.
02-0944/AF) (testimony of Harrison).
[d. at 5.
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 201.
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"he [Harrison] loved him [Marcum] ."91 For his part, Marcum admitted only to "kissing [Harrison's] penis twice."92 Additionally, both
men testified that they had had a previous encounter in which Harrison had apparently lain down on top of Marcum and was "moving his
pelvis area against [Marcum's] butt ... [Harrison] had an erection
"93

The court-martial jury, a panel of officer and enlisted members,
found Marcum innocent on the forcible sodomy charge, "but guilty of
non-forcible sodomy in violation of Article 125."94 Thus, in light of
the Lawrence ruling, the door was opened for an appellate challenge
of Marcum's conviction. 95
B.

Standard of Review

From the onset of its consideration of Marcum's appeal, the Court
relied on its previous holding from United States v. Scoby96 in asserting
that "Article 125 forbids sodomy whether it is consensual or forcible,
heterosexual or homosexual, public or private."97 The court then
considered whether Article 125 remained constitutional after Lawrence. 98 Because the case presented a constitutional question, the
court reviewed this case de novo. 99 Following an in-depth review of
Lawrence, the Marcum court was persuaded that the Supreme Court
did not rely on any particular method of traditional constitutional
analysis. lOo The court was particularly focused on the limits articulated by the Lawrence Court stating, "[ t] he Supreme Court did not expressly state whether or not this text represented an exhaustive or
illustrative list of exceptions to the liberty interest identified.... "101
In deciding which standard of review to use, the court acknowledged the use of "either the rational basis test or strict scrutiny might
well prove dispositive of a facial challenge to Article 125."102 However,
the court was compelled by neither and opted for a case by case analysis instead of reviewing the statute on its face.10 3 This contextual anal9l. Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 6, Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (No.
02-0944/AF); Marcum, 60 MJ. at 20l.
92. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 200.
93. Id. at 20l.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 199-200; see also supra note 85 (detailing the issues granted for review
in Marcum's various appeals).
96. 5 MJ. 160 (C.M.A. 1978).
97. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 202.
98. Id. at 202-07.
99. Id. at 202-03 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)).
100. Id. at 204.
10l. Id. at 203.
102. Id. at 204; see also supra note 70 (discussing the different standards of
review).
103. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205. Relying on the Supreme Court's distaste for broad,
facial challenges the court cited Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609
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ysis, the Marcum court argued, required a constitutional review based
on the Due Process Clause. 104
Further, the court noted that the Lawrence court failed to articulate
the privacy interest at issue in the case as a fundamental right. 105
Thus, the court would not take it upon itself to impute a fundamental
right to members of the military where the Supreme Court had not
even extended it in a civilian context. 106
C.

Lawrence in the Military Environment

The Marcum court concluded that Lawrence applied in the military
context, but it refused to adopt the decision's implications for the military.107 The court determined that the application of Lawrence required a different standard for servicemembers than it would for
civilians. 108 Focusing on various cases where the court has upheld servicemembers' rights,109 the court stated it had routinely extended the
protections of the Bill of Rights to the military, "except in cases where
the express terms of the Constitution make such application inapposite."llo The court explained that '" [t]he military is, by necessity, a
specialized society,"'l11 and therefore, "it is clear that servicemembers,
as a general matter, do not share the same autonomy as civilians."1l2
In this context, the court cites First and Fourth Amendment cases
where the protected liberty interest in a civilian context does not withstand similar inquiry in a military context because of unique military
requirements inherent in providing the United States' national defenseY3 Thus, based on its previous preference for a case-by-case test
and by extending the Lawrence analysis to the military environment,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

1l0.
llI.
ll2.
ll3.

(2004), in which the Supreme Court noted that facial challenges are "especially to be discouraged." Id. at 206.
Id. at 205; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme Court also based its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 205.
Id.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 205-06.
Id. at 205 (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 u.S. 503, 507, 509 (1986)
(military regulation prohibiting wear of religious headgear does not violate
the First Amendment), superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086
(allowing wear of religious headgear in certain circumstances) and United
States v. Mitchell, 39 MJ. 131, 135 (C.MA 1994) (upholding annual evaluation requirement of military judges as within the Fifth Amendment».
Id.
Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (finding neither Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer, nor Article 134, general article,
void for vagueness or constitutionally overbroad».
Id. at 206.
Id. at 205-06 (citing United States v. Priest, 21 C.MA 564, 570 (C.MA
1972) (First Amendment) and United States v. McCarthy, 38 MJ. 398, 40304 (C.MA 1993) (Fourth Amendment».
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the court determined the appropriate challenge for Article 125 sodomy cases is to be limited to the facts of each case that served as the
basis for conviction. 1l4 The Marcum court then laid out a two-step test
to determine whether a constitutionally protected zone of privacy exists in each case. 1l5
D.

The Court's New Rule: The Multi-part Marcum Test

To analyze Article 125 consensual sodomy cases, the court stated
one must take a two-step approachY6 First, a court must analyze
whether an accused's sexual conduct was within Lawrence's protections
and second, if not within Lawrence's protections, the court must determine if the accused's sexual conduct was of the type proscribed by
Article 125.117 To analyze this first part, the court developed a novel
three prong test to apply in military cases:
First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of
committing of a nature to bring it within the liberty interest
identified by the Supreme Court? Second, did the conduct
encompass any behavior or factors identified by the Supreme
Court as outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third, are there
additional factors relevant solely in the military environment
that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty
interest?1l8
Although the Marcum court did not break each prong of the test
into individual elements, clearly each prong is comprised of its own
requirementsY9 An evaluation of the components of the test will aid
one in applying a discrete set of facts to the Marcum Test. 120 This new
three-prong Marcum Test will determine if Lawrence's liberty interest
applies in a military setting to the conduct in question, and, thus,
whether the conduct will be protected. 121 The first prong enunciates
which conduct comes within the scope of Lawrence's protection while
the last two prongs describe exceptions which may give otherwise protected conduct, unprotected statuS. 122
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 208.
Id. This comment focuses on analyzing the first step of the analysis. The
second step, whether the behavior actually violated Article 125, i.e. was the
sexual act sodomy, will necessarily be determined during an analysis of the
first part. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Thus, this comment
refers to the entire test as the Marcum Test, although technically the Marcum Test presented here analyzes only the dispositive first step.
Id. at 206-07 (citation omitted).
Id.
This analysis of the Marcum Test is applied to various factual scenarios later
in the comment. See discussion infra Parts IV.E., F. and V.C.
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 206-07.
Id.
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The First Prong-Sexual Conduct Within Lawrence's Protections

In the first prong, whether the conduct is within the scope of Lawrence, there are four requirements, which, if all are satisfied, allows the
analysis to proceed to the next prong of the Marcum Test. 123 Here,
the court states that the ultimate question to ask is, "did [the accused's] conduct involve private, consensual sexual activity between
adults?"124 Thus, the four requirements that must be satisfied in this
first prong of the Marcum Test are: 125

a. Was the conduct sexual activity?126
b. Was the conduct in private, as opposed to in public?
c. Was the conduct consensual?
d. Was the conduct between adults?127
Again, if all four of these questions are answered in the affirmative,
the conduct is presumably protected pending the outcome of the next
two prongs of the Marcum Test. 128 If at least one question is answered
in the negative, then the analysis is complete as the conduct falls
outside the protective shield of Lawrence, and therefore IS
prosecutable. 129

2.

The Second Prong-General Exceptions to Lawrence's Protections

The second prong of the test enunciates the first set of exceptions
to Lawrence's protection. 130 It asks whether, satisfYing the first prong
notwithstanding, the conduct nonetheless falls outside the scope of
Lawrence by virtue of any of the exceptions stated in Lawrence. 131 If any
of these exceptions are found, i.e., any of the below questions are answered in the affirmative, the conduct would not be protected.
Here there appear to be four exceptions: 132
a. Did the conduct involve prostitution?133
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Although the court articulates this question as "sexual activity," in context,
the court was referring to sodomy. See id.
The court gave some guidance on its interpretation of consent and children in a post-Marcum case. While discussing other issues, the court stated
in United States v. Banker that while, "a child under the age of 16 may factually consent to certain sexual activity, this Court has never recognized the
ability of a child to legally consent to sexual intercourse or sodomy." 60
MJ. 216, 220 (CAA.F. 2004).
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Did the conduct involve persons who might be injured
or coerced? 134
Did the conduct involve persons who were situated in relationships where consent might not be easily refused? 135
Did the conduct involve other circumstances that would
tend to place the conduct outside the scope of
Lawrence? 1 ~6

In its holding the court explained this prong of the Marcum Test
with some unnecessary steps. For example, the court asked whether
the conduct involved minors or was in public. 137 This is duplicative; if
either of these were true, the analysis presumably would not proceed
beyond the first part of the Marcum Test which requires the conduct
to be private and between adults. 138
Additionally, the injury or coercion to which the Lawrence court refers is unclear,139 although one could, presumably, get to this step of
the analysis if the accused had taken advantage of an incompetent
adult. In a situation like that, while the sexual contact may have been
technically "consented to" and was in private, an incompetent adult
could be unknowingly, and even willingly, injured. The state, it
seems, would have a legitimate interest in a case like that.
As for the second half of the second exception, coercion, the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces has previously stated that a "coercive
atmosphere ... includes, for example, threats to injure others or statements that resistance would be futile"140 and that "[c]onsent [ ... ]
induced by ... coercion is equivalent to physical force."141 Byapplying these definitions, the logical inference is that behavior compelled
by force would not be consensual. Thus, this exception is also unnecessary as the Marcum Test's first prong, specifically the requirement
that the conduct be consensual, would again be dispositive. 142
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
See supra Part IV.D., notes 126-29 and accompanying text.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). While it is unclear what type
of injury either the Lawrence Court or the Marcum court was referring to, as
is demonstrated below, physical and emotional injuries could be conceptualized. While physical injuries would potentially result from a rape, that
scenario would be dealt with in the first prong of the Marcum Test and
therefore not survive to be analyzed in the second prong. Additionally, any
type of scenario involving emotional injury would likely involve some sort of
doctor-patient, senior-subordinate, or adult-child relationship which would
be analyzed using other prongs or exceptions rather than under this exception. See infra Part V.C.
140. United States v. Simpson, 58 MJ. 368, 377 (CAA.F. 2003) (citing MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para. 45.c. (l)(b) (2002».
141. [d. (omissions in original) (quoting United States v. Palmer, 33 MJ. 7, 9
(C.MA 1991».
142. See supra Part IV.D.
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The third exception in this second prong of the Marcum Test, involving the ability to easily refuse consent, is important in the military
context because of the military's hierarchical nature. 143 As the court
points out, "the nuance of military life is significant."144 The Air
Force's regulation governing unprofessional relationships further articulates the importance of the policy maintaining professional relationships in the military context:
[T] he nature of the military mission requires absolute confidence in command and an unhesitating adherence to orders
that may result in inconvenience, hardships or, at times, injury or death. This distinction makes the maintenance of
professional relationships in the military more critical than
in civilian organizations. 145
Indeed, this part of the test is where the Marcum court would eventually find that Marcum's conduct, involving a senior-subordinate relationship, was an exception to the reach of Lawrence's protections. 146
As to the final exception in this prong of the test, other circumstances placing the conduct outside Lawrence's protections, the Marcum court left open the range of conduct which might be
encompassed. 147 The court noted the Supreme Court had failed to
express whether the Lawrence exceptions it articulated were inclusive,
thus the court was likewise unwilling to limit itself.148 Therefore,
when analyzing conduct that does not seem to fit into any of the previous exceptions, one must ensure that the conduct might not somehow
fit under this "other circumstances" exception, assuming that the conduct would not be considered a military-unique factor encompassed
by the final prong of the test. 149
In sum, in the second prong of the Marcum Test there are four exceptions to Lawrence's protections which would bring one's conduct
outside of constitutional protections: prostitution, likelihood of injury, inability to refuse consent and the catch-all, other circumstances.
While seemingly limited to these four exceptions, their application to
143. See e.g., Air Force Instruction 38-101 §§ 2.2, 2.3, Air Force Organization, at 812 (April 21, 2004), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/
af/38/afi38-101/afi38-101.pdf (describing the various organizations and
chain of command structure within the Air Force).
144. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
145. Air Force Instruction 36-2909 Professional and Unprofessional Relationships, §1
at 2 (May 1, 1999), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/
36/ afi36-2909 / afi36-2909. pdf.
146. See infra Part IV.E.
147. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207 (using the open-ended language "for instance" to
describe examples of conduct).
148. [d. at 205; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions to the protections of Lawrence).
149. See Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207.
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a wide variety of fact patterns, especially in a hierarchical organization, seems limitless.
3.

The Third Prong-Military Unique Exceptions to Lawerence's
Protections

The final prong of the Marcum Test is, in essence, a military specific
catch-all; it asks whether any military-unique factors would create exceptions to the applicability of Lawrence?150
This prong will likely have broad application in light of the Supreme Court's, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces', view
that "[t]he fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent
necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within
the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible
outside it."151
Although this prong was not analyzed by the Marcum court,152 it will
likely be used in future cases. Indeed, in the only other case in which
the court has applied the Marcum Test, United States v. Stirewalt,153 this
part was used when none of the previous parts of the test applied. 154
In Stirewalt, Stirewalt performed sodomy on a superior officer, who
presumably could have easily refused consent. 155 The court relied on
this last prong to place Stirewalt's behavior outside of Lawrence's protections, because none of the previous prongs were applicable. 156
This final prong, because of its open-endedness, may cause the most
confusion about what conduct is protected within the military context.
It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that virtually all military sodomy convictions with even the slightest military nexus could stand based upon
this prong alone.
To understand how the court will likely use the overall Marcum Test,
this comment will now explore the only two cases the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has decided using the Marcum Test: United
States v. Marcum and United States v. Stirewalt. 157
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974». See also Major Steve
Cullen, Prosecuting Indecent Conduct in the Military: Honey, Should we get a
Legal Review First?, 179 MIL. L. REv. 128, 160-63 (2004) (arguing military
should be treated the same as civilians for private sexual acts and that Parker
v. Levy should be limited to the First Amendment); Baime, supra note 53, at
127-32 (arguing there are no compelling reasons to proscribe consensual
sodomy in the military).
152. See id. at 208 (deciding Marcum on the second prong of the test and not
discussing the third).
153. 60 MJ. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1682 (2005).
154. See infra Part IV.F.
155. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303-04.
156. Id. at 304.
157. See infra Parts IV.E-F.
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The Marcum Test as Applied to Technical Sergeant Marcum

The court found that Marcum's conduct fell outside the protections
of Lawrence, and thus, Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy
stood. 158 In arriving at this determination the court found that the
first prong of the Marcum Test, whether the conduct was between consenting adults in private, was satisfied by virtue of the court-martial
finding of consensual sodomy.159 The court "assume[d] without deciding" that these two adults' conduct was consensual and in
private. 160
The court took a more in depth view of the second prong of the
Marcum Test, whether the conduct fell outside the scope of Lawrence
by virtue of any of the exceptions enunciated in Lawrence, and concluded Harrison "was a person 'who might be coerced.' "161 In so doing, the court primarily focused on one exception in the second
prong, namely whether the conduct involved persons who were in relationships where consent might not be easily refused. 162 Eventually,
it was this element that would prove to be insurmountable for
Marcum. 163
The conclusion here seems inevitable. Marcum was two grades senior to Harrison; he was his direct supervisor and a noncommissioned
officer as well. 164 The court stated that not only was this conduct a
violation of Article 125, it also fell under Article 92, in that the unprofessional relationship was a failure to obey a regulation, specifically Air
Force Instruction 36-2909,165 which forbids relationships "when they
detract from the authority of superiors or result in, or reasonably create the appearance of, favoritism, misuse of office or position, or the
abandonment of organization.al goals for personal interests."166
Having disposed of the case on the second prong of the Marcum
Test, the court did not analyze the third prong of the test 167 and allowed Marcum's conviction for consensual sodomy to stand. 168 However, a little more than a month after deciding Marcum, the court did
analyze the third prong of its test in United States v. Stirewalt. 169
158. Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208, 211.
159. Id. at 207.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

166.
167.
168.

169.

Id.
Id. at 207-08 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003».
Id.
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 207-08.
Id. at 200, 208.
Id. at 207-08.
Air Force Instruction 36-2909 Professional and Unprofessional Relationships,
§ 2.2, at 2 (May 1, 1999), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pub
files/af/36/afi36-2909/afi36-2909.pdf.
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208.
Id. at 208, 211.
60 MJ. 297, 304 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1682 (2005).
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The Marcum Test Applied in United States v. Stirewalt

Health Services Technician Second Class Darrell Stirewalt (E-5) was
convicted, after two trials, of one count of consensual sodomy, under
Article 125, UCMJ. 170 In his first trial, Stirewalt was convicted of forcible sodomy of a superior officer;171 however, on appeal he won a retrial based upon an evidentiary issue. 172 At his retrial Stirewalt
entered a guilty plea to one count of consensual sodomy under Article
125. 173
The court, for the first time after Marcum, employed its own Marcum
Test analysis to the facts in Stirewalt. 174 As to prong one, whether the
sexual conduct was between consenting adults in private, and prong
two, whether the conduct fell under any of the Lawrence exceptions,
the court "assume[d] without deciding," that the conduct was within
the scope of Lawrence. 175
Based on its ruling here and in Marcum the court seems unlikely to
analyze prong one of the test if a court-martial concludes a member is
guilty of consensual sodomy.176 Additionally, where, as in Stirewalt,
the accused is subordinate to the alleged victim, it is unlikely the court
will find a situation where consent could be coerced or not easily refused by an alleged victim who is senior in rank. l77 Therefore, the
170. Id. at 298-99.
17l. Id. at 298,304; see also United States v. Stirewalt, 53 MJ. 582 (C.G. Ct. Crim.
App. 2000), afj'd, United States v. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. 297 (CAAF. 2004).
172. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 298-99; see United States v. Stirewalt, 53 MJ. 582, 587-90
(C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (finding that Military Rule of Evidence 412, the
rape shield law, only shields victims of nonconsensual sexual misconduct).
Stirewalt successfully argued that a former roommate of the alleged victim,
who was allowed to testifY regarding a previous consensual adulterous affair
with Stirewalt, should have been able to be cross-examined regarding a different consensual sexual relationship she had had with another enlisted
man and the punishment she (the former roommate) had received. Id. at
587-88. As a result, Stirewalt argued he was not able to establish a defense
that the victim in his case knew the repercussions of her actions and was
only accusing him to protect her career. Id. at 588. This finding by the
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals was further explained later by the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v. Banker, 60 MJ.
216, 218-21 (C.AAF. 2004). It stated, "[Military Rule of Evidence] 412
hinges on whether the subject of the proffered evidence was a victim of the
alleged sexual misconduct and not on whether the alleged sexual misconduct was consensual or nonconsensual." Id. at 220.
173. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303.
174. Id. at 304. The court referred to its test as a "tripartite framework." Id.
175. Id.
176. See Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 303-04; United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198, 207
(CAAF. 2004).
177. Compare Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208 (subordinate "victim"), with Stirewalt, 60
MJ. at 304 (superior officer "victim"). The court assumes prong two is satisfied in Stirewalt where the alleged victim is senior to the accused, id., however, in Marcum, the accused was senior to the alleged victim, thereby
warranting an analysis under prong two of the Marcum Test. Marcum, 60
MJ. at 208. But see United States v. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109 (AF. Ct.
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court was left with only one option and decided this case based on the
third prong of the Marcum Test, whether any military-unique factors
affect the reach of Lawrence. 178
Noting that the relationship in question was between an officer,
who happened to be Stirewalt's department head, and a subordinate
enlisted crew member,179 the court quoted from the Coast Guard's
Personnel Manual:
Romantic relationships between members are unacceptable when:
1. Members have a supervisor and subordinate relationship ... , or
2. Members are assigned to the same small shore unit
... , or ...
3. Members are assigned to the same cutter.... 180
This policy applies regardless of rank, grade, or
position. t81
In light of the Coast Guard's military-unique regulations and "the
clear military interests of discipline and order that they reflect," the
court placed Stirewalt's conduct outside of the protection of Lawrence. 182 Further, the court specifically stated that the fact only the
subordinate Stirewalt was charged did not "alter the nature of the liberty interest at stake."183 For the second time in as many opportunities
the court affirmed a servicemember's court-martial conviction of consensual sodomy.184

v.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES' NEW
STANDARD, ITS CONSTITUTIONALIlY AND APPLICABILIlY
TODAY

Even before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence in 2003,185 servicemembers have been attacking the constitutionality of Article 125

178.
179.
180.
181.

182.
183.
184.
185.

Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2005) (finding that a senior-subordinate consensual
heterosexual sexual relationship, with a subordinate "victim," warranted
analysis under the third prong, other military unique factors, and not the
second prong, inability to easily refuse consent, as was the case with a similar (albeit homosexual) fact pattern in Marcum).
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 304.
Id.
A cutter is a "small, lightly anned [motor]boat used by the Coast Guard."
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 451 (4th ed. 2000).
Stirewalt, 60 MJ. at 304 (quoting COAST GUARD PERSONNEL MANUAL, Interpersonal Relationships within the Coast Guard, para. 8.H.2.f at 8.H 4-5 (change 38,
2002), available at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-w/g-wp/g-wpm/PersMan/
PERSMAN%200pening.pdf (Unacceptable Romantic Relationships».
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305; see also supra Part IV.E.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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on two fronts: it violates their right to privacyIS6 and is void for vagueness. IS7 As was previously discussed, the Marcum and Stirewalt rulings
have quashed, for now, the latest attacks on the military's sodomy statute under right to privacy principles enunciated in Lawrence. ISS Yet, in
deflecting the right to privacy attack, the court may have left itself
susceptible to an attack based on the void for vagueness principle 1s9
when it created the three-prong Marcum Test. 19o
A.

Void for Vagueness

The Supreme Court's standard for void for vagueness doctrine has
been oft cited: "The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or
warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to
prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."'191
In United States v. Scoby the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
specifically analyzed the phrase "unnatural carnal copulation" for
vagueness. 192 In Scoby, the court reviewed holdings from various state
courts, which were mixed,193 and determined the proper backdrop to
analyze the vagueness claim was the Due Process Clause. 194 The
court, quoting the Supreme Court, stated, "[a]ll the Due Process
186. See supra Part N.C. See also, e.g., United States v. Allen, 53 MJ. 402, 410
(CAA.F. 2000) (holding sodomy with a spouse, in private, is not a protected privacy right when "not in furtherance of the marriage"); United
States v. Thompson, 47 MJ. 378, 379 (CAA.F. 1997) (holding husband
had no right to privacy guarantee with his wife when sodomy occurred
while he was assaulting her); United States v. Henderson, 34 MJ. 174, 17678 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that consensual heterosexual fellatio is not protected by a right to privacy under the Constitution); United States v. Scoby,
5 MJ. 160, 164-66 (C.MA 1978) (holding no right to privacy protection
when sex acts occurred in semi-private living quarters); see also Baime, supra
note 53, at 110-114 (discussing, pre-Lawrence, the right to privacy and sodomy within the military environment).
187. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 30 MJ. 53, 56 (C.MA 1990) (finding that
a charge of aggravated assault was not void for vagueness in light of the
defendant being warned he could be criminally liable for any acts of sodomy); Scoby, 5 MJ. at 163 (holding the proscriptions of the military'S sodomy statute are understood by a person of ordinary intelligence).
188. See supra Parts N.E-F.
189. See infra Part VA.
190. See supra Part N.D.
19l. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974».
192. 5 MJ. 160, 161-63 (1978).
193. Id. at 161-62. Alaska, Ohio, and Florida had ruled that definitions similar to
the one used here were unconstitutionally vague. Id. While the United
States Supreme Court, in Rnse v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49-50 (1975), along with
the state courts of New Jersey, Nevada, Michigan, Missouri, Indiana, Maine,
Oklahoma, and New Mexico did not view "crimes against nature," or like
definitions, as unconstitutionally vague. State v. Lair, 301 A.2d 748, 752
(NJ. 1973).
194. Scoby, 5 MJ. at 162.

260

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may
conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden."195 With
this standard, the court reviewed the history of the phrase "crimes
against nature," which it felt was similar to "unnatural carnal copulation,"196 and opined, as did the Supreme Court, that anyone who
wanted to know what particular acts would fit under this language
could have easily determined them. 197 With this finding, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces easily determined the phrase was defined well enough so that the average service member would understand what it means, and therefore, the phrase was not
unconstitutionally vague. 198
In another case, United States v. Johnson, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces found a charge for aggravated assault was not void for
vagueness when the underlying act was consensual sodomy.199 In
Johnson, however, the service member was given specific warnings that,
due to his HIV positive status and the harm that could befall others if
he were to engage in sodomy, he could be held criminally liable. 20o
With the court's creation of the Marcum Test, one could surmise the
court changed what was once, arguably, an understandable statute
into one that the servicemember of "ordinary intelligence"201 might
not understand. Courts, however, attempt to avoid constitutional concerns when they create limiting tests;202 therefore, it would seem, to
remain constitutional the Marcum Test would have to be interpreted
in lock-step with Lawrence. Thus, one could argue that for servicemembers, just like civilians, consensual, non-economic, private
sodomy between adults should not be outlawed. 203 This argument
fails, however, because constitutional rights in the military setting are
not interpreted in lock-step with the civilian world. 204
195. [d. (quoting Rose, 423 U.S. at 50).
196. [d. "'~he ,I?,hrase has been in use among English-speaking people for many
centunes.
[d.
197. [d. Interestingly, the court did not define the specific acts which might
define this phrase, stating that "some esoteric acts may not easily be identifiable as within or without the scope of Article 125," however, it did quote
the United States Supreme Court citing the Missouri Supreme Court,
which stated that the phrase "embraced sodomy, bestiality, buggery, fellatio, and cunnilingus within its terms." [d. at 162-63 (quoting Rose, 423 U.S.
at 50).
198. [d. at 163.
199. 30 MJ. 53, 56 (C.MA 1990).

200. [d.
201. Scory, 5 MJ. at 163.
202. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 211 (2003). "If a reasonable limiting
construction 'has been or could be placed on the challenged statute' to
avoid constitutional concerns, we should embrace it." [d. (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1,44 (1976)).
203. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
204. See infra Part V.B.
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Constitutional Rights as Applied to Military Members

While the Supreme Court has said, "men and women in the Armed
Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection
behind when they enter military service,"205 the Court has also noted
that military life is not the same as civilian life 206 and therefore, due
process rights might be less in the military sphere. 207
The Marcum court itself proclaimed that, "an understanding of military culture and mission cautions against sweeping constitutional pronouncements that may not account for the nuance of military life."208
The court also remarked, however, that the Lawrence Court had failed
to limit the liberty interest it sought to protect to only civilians, thus
implicitly granting the rights to military personne1. 209
Yet, in the military context, "(j]udicial deference ... 'is at its apogee' when reviewing congressional decision making in th[e] [Due
Process] area."210 Therefore, while the rights articulated in Lawrence
would apply to military members, Congress enjoys latitude in regulating those rights. 211
205. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg,]., concurring)
(finding appointments of military judges within the scope of both the Article II Appointments Clause and the Fifth Amendment).
206. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749, 758 (1974).
207. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (determining that Congress's requiring men, and not women, to register for the draft did not
violate the men's Due Process rights partly because of combat restrictions
placed on women). But see Captain Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The
Unconstitutionality of the Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement
Under Modern Gender-Based Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYrON L. REv. 135 (2003)
(arguing in today's world Rostker no longer applies). See also Cullen, supra
note 151, at 160-63 (discussing Parker v. Levy and arguing that simply because First Amendment restrictions are placed against the military, the
same urgency does not exist when dealing with the consensual sexual conduct described by Lawrence).
208. United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,206 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
209. Id.
210. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Rostker, 453 U.S.
at 70) (holding that military judges were sufficiently insulated from command influence to satisfy due process requirements).
211. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 756 (finding that differences between military and
civilian life warrants applying different constitutional standards when reviewing constitutional questions arising in the military context). But see
Baime, supra note 53, at 130-32 (stating it is "disingenuous to argue that
private consensual sodomy is prejudicial to good order and discipline or
service discrediting" to maintain that there exists a military need to intrude
into servicemembers' bedrooms); Cullen, supra note 151, at 162-63 (arguing the military has no "particular need to regulate the adult, consensual,
noncommercial, private sex-related decisions of its members"). See also
James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen'5 Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177 (1984). Although over 20
years old, this article provides a still useful, in-depth discussion of constitutional rights as they apply in the military context. See id.
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Against this backdrop, the Marcum court faced the difficult task of
balancing servicemembers' constitutional rights against Congress's Article I right to regulate the military.212 The result was the compromise
Marcum Test,213 whereby the court has left Congress's law in place,
while simultaneously expanding the rights of most, but not all, servicemembers to fit within the scope of Lawrence. 214
C.

What Conduct is Now (Im)permissible in the Military Environment?

There are few foreseeable circumstances which would warrant prosecuting private, consensual sodomy between adults. 215 For now, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has found two situations that
merit prosecution. 216 First, Marcum made clear that the existence of a
senior-subordinate relationship between the parties fails the second
prong of the Marcum Test if the person charged is the senior person,
regardless of the consensual nature of the homosexual or heterosexual conduct. 217 Second, based on Stirewalt, a senior-subordinate relationship can fail the third prong of the Marcum Test if the person
performing the act is the subordinate person, regardless of the consensual nature of the homosexual or heterosexual conduct. 218
What these two holdings have in common is that the underlying
relationship which formed the basis for the sexual contact was in itself
impermissible in the military setting. 219 Thus, for servicemembers tryMarcum, 60 MJ. at 206; U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, d. 14.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra Parts III., IV.C.
See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 18, at 66.
See supra Parts IV.E-F.
See supra Part IV.E. But see supra note 177 (discussing the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals's use of the Marcum Test's third prong to uphold the conviction of the senior officer in a senior-subordinate relationship).
218. See supra Part IV.F.
219. See supra Parts IV.E-F.; cf United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (mem.). This was the first case to be decided by
a lower military appeals court since the Marcum ruling took effect. The
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, applying the Marcum Test,
overturned an unmarried, male soldier's heterosexual consensual sodomy
conviction with a female civilian where there was no military nexus. Id. at 45. This case further supports the relationship-based analysis because the
relationship here was not proscribed (male military member and adult female civilian) by military regulations or the UCMJ. See id. at 5; see also
United States v. Myers, 2005 CCA LEXIS 44 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 10,
2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction of male military member
and adult female, civilian spouse of another military member based on
third part of Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v. Avery,
2005 CCA LEXIS 59 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction of married male military member with adult female civilians based on third prong of Marcum Test, unique military
factors); United States v. Bart, 61 MJ. 578 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction of unmarried female military member with co-worker, married male military member based on third prong of
Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v. Christian, 61 MJ.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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ing to determine if their conduct is proscribed or not, the ultimate
question should be whether the underlying relationship is prohibited,
either by regulation or the UCMJ. In fact, the government in Marcum
focused on the unprofessional relationship cases that have been applied to heterosexual sodomy.220
Based on this permitted/not-permitted relationship analysis, the
Marcum court's implication that it was not considering the impact of
the holding on the military's homosexual policy becomes somewhat
clearer. 221 In summing up the Marcum Test, the court stated that it
need not determine what constitutional impact the military's homosexual policy would have on the sodomy statute. 222 Until the court
completely works through the Marcum Test in a situation that would
otherwise be protected, but for its homosexual nature, this issue will
not be resolved. Nevertheless, the implication, which is consistent
with a relationship-based analysis, is that even if an accused satisfies
the first two prongs of the Marcum Test, he or she may still not overcome the conviction by virtue of the impermissibility of the homosexual relationship and the "unique conditions of military service," thus
failing to satisfy the Marcum Test's third prong. 223

220.

221.
222.
223.

560 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction
of married, male military member with unmarried civilian female based on
third prong of Marcum Test, unique military factors); United States v.
Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109 (AF. Ct. Crim. App. March 30, 2005) (upholding consensual sodomy conviction of married, male military officer
with unmarried female enlisted military member based on third prong of
Marcum Test, unique military factors). These cases further support the relationship analysis. In all, the relationships were proscribed by Article 134,
the general article, as adultery. 10 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (2000); see also
MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL Pt. IV, para. 62, at IV-97 (2002 Edition). In
fact, all servicemembers were also convicted for adultery. Myers, 2005 CCA
LEXIS 44, at *1, *7; Avery, 2005 CCA LEXIS 59, at *1, *6; Bart, 61 MJ. at
579, 584; Christian, 61 MJ. at 561, 567; Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *1.
In Gamez, however, Gamez's adultery charge was conditionally dismissed on
appeal. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13. This does not change the
relationship-based analysis because Gamez's conviction for fraternization
with an enlisted female member was allowed to stand. Id. at *14-16.
See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 10-11, United States
v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.AF. 2004) (No. 02-0944/AF) (citing United
States v. Ayers, 54 MJ. 85 (C.A.AF. 2000) (consent in an inappropriate
relationship does not preclude a conviction, here a military instructor and
trainee); United States v. Boyett, 42 MJ. 150 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (conviction
affirmed for sexual relationship between officer and enlisted person under
Article 133, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer); United States v. Bygrave, 46
MJ. 491 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (HIV positive service member having unprotected
sex convicted of assault)).
Marcum, 60 MJ. at 208.
Id. (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 654 which is the "Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces" and is commonly referred to as the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy); see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (2000).
10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (8) (A); see also discussion supra Part IV.F. For example,
Stirewalt's consensual, heterosexual sodomy charge was also analyzed, and
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Therefore, a consensual, non-commercial heterosexual relationship
between adults, whether military-military or civilian-military, that does
not violate any of the military's unprofessional relationship regulations 224 or other laws (not including the sodomy statute), would be
permissible. 225 The same homosexual relationship, however, by virtue
of 10 U.S.C. § 654, would likely not be protected.
VI.

ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO CHARGING CONSENSUAL
SODOMY

If the military courts of appeals continue to follow the relationshipbased analysis 226 then actually charging sodomy as a crime would not
only be unnecessary because the underlying relationship will be
prosecutable,227 it may also be multiplicious.

A.

Use oj Alternate Punitive Articles oj the UeM]

Relying on the relationship-based analysis, a number of alternatives
are available to military prosecutors to punish military members engaged in impermissible relationships, regardless whether any sexual
contact has occurred. 228 In its supplemental brief, to support the legitimacy of the sodomy statute, the government cited a number of
cases that were disposed of with other than Article 125 convictions. 229
Even the Marcum court pointed out that the conduct Marcum was
convicted of, Article 125, consensual sodomy, could have been
charged under Article 92, for violating a regulation,23o because Marcum was in violation of the Air Force's unprofessional relationships
regulation. 231

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

230.
231.

upheld, on the basis of military unique factors, namely an impermissible
senior-subordinate relationship. See supra Part IV.F.
See infra Part VIA.
See United States v. Bullock, ARMY 20030534 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30,
2004) (mem.) (overturning consensual sodomy charge between military
member and civilian where underlying relationship was permissible).
See supra Part V.C.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text (charging servicemembers with
relationship-based crime as well as consensual sodomy).
See infra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 10-11, United States
v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (No. 02-0944/AF) (citing United
States v. Ayers, 54 MJ. 85 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (upholding Articles 92, Failure to
Obey a Regulation and 134, General Article conviction for military instructor having adulterous relationship with trainee); United States v. Boyett, 42
MJ. 150 (C.A.A.F. 1995) (affirming Article 133, Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer, conviction for sexual relationship between officer and enlisted person); United States v. Bygrave, 46 MJ. 491 (CA.A.F. 1997) (upholding assault conviction of HIV positive service member having unprotected sex».
United States v. Marcum, 60 MJ. 198,208 (CA.A.F. 2004).
Id. at 207-08; seeAir Force Instruction 36-2909, Professional and Unprofessional
Relationships paras. 2.1, 2.2, 4, 5, 5.1 (May I, 1999), available at http://www.
e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afi36-2909/afi36-2909.pdf.
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Thus, consensual sodomy cases that come under the umbrella of
"unprofessional relationships" can be charged under Article 92, for
failure to follow a regulation,232 Article 133, for conduct unbecoming
an officer,233 or Article 134, the general article, which is also the article under which adultery is charged. 234
Additionally, consensual homosexual sodomy cases can be handled
administratively under 10 U.S.C. § 654, the military's homosexual policy, with, for example, an administrative discharge. 235 The policy covers, in detail, Congress's belief that "[t]here is no constitutional right
to serve in the armed forces,"236 the distinct differences between civilian and military life,237 the steps to be taken to separate servicemembers if they meet certain homosexual "qualifiers,"238 and
some of the rights of those targeted by the statute. 239
The sodomy statute is thus duplicative as applied to homosexuals, if
the government's purpose is to separate those who have, or would,
engage in consensual homosexual conduct. 24o 10 U.S.C. § 654 clearly
232. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892 art. 92 (2000):

233.

234.

235.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Failure to obey order or regulation
Any person subject to this chapter who(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey
the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.
[d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para. 16, at IV-23-25
(2002).
See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 10 U.S.C. § 933 art. 133 (2000). "Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman:
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a courtmartial may direct." [d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV, para.
59, at IV-93 (2002).
See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 art. 134 (2000).
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the pn:judice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according
to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at
the discretion of that court.
[d.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, Pt. IV., para. 60, at IV-94 (2002).
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000); see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE
LAw 230-32 (Thomas L. Strand & Michael W. Goldman eds., 7th ed. 2004)
(instructing commanders on the process for administratively separating homosexual servicemembers).
10 U.S.c. § 654(a)(2).
10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (8)(A)-(B).
Author's term; see 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1)-(3).
10 U.S.c. § 654(d).
See Supplemental Final Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 6-7, United States v.
Marcum, 60 MJ. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (No. 02-0944/ AF); see also THE MILl-
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covers the breadth of homosexual conduct, even covering non-acts, as
the statute covers those who say they are homosexual without ever having committed a homosexual act. 241 Therefore, based solely on the
government's interest to separate homosexuals from military service,
the sodomy statute adds only a criminal conviction 242 which, when
taken in conjunction with the administrative discharge that 10 U.S.C.
§ 654 requires, does nothing more than provide a newly separated homosexual servicemember with a federal conviction with which to restart his or her life. 243
Charging Article 125, consensual sodomy, in almost every instance,
becomes duplicative at the least, and multiplicious at most. Further, it
leaves a case vulnerable to a constitutionally grounded appellate review if a conviction is awarded based on a consensual sodomy
charge. 244

B.

Multiplicity

The protection from multiplicity is based upon the Fifth Amendment principle "against double jeopardy [which] provides that an accused cannot be convicted of both an offense and a lesser-included
offense."245 To raise a claim of multiplicity, an accused must raise the
issue at trial or the issue will only be reviewed by an appellate court for
plain error. 246 The idea that two charges are "factually the same" is a
basic premise of a multiplicity claim. 247 The Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has stated,
[An] [a]ppellant may show plain error and overcome
[waiver] by showing that the specifications are facially duplica-

24l.
242.
243.

244.
245.
246.
247.

TARY COMMANDER AND THE LAw, supra note 235, at 230-32 (requiring a commander to initiate administrative discharge proceedings and only allowing
an Under Other than Honorable Condition discharge if certain circumstances exists, such as force, sex with a minor, in public, for money, in a
prohibited senior-subordinate relationship, or on a military vessel); 10
U.S.C. § 654.
See 10 U.S.c. § 654(b)(2) (requiring only a finding that a servicemember
"intends to engage in homosexual acts").
10 U.S.c. § 925, art. 125(b) (2000) ("punished as a court-martial may
direct").
10 U.S.C. § 654(b). The statute requires that a service member "shall be
separated from the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense." Id. Based on principles of statutory construction, this
implies an administrative discharge, not a court-martial, because when a
court-martial is preferred the statute will articulate that. See, e.g., supra
notes 238-39; see also THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAw supra note
235, at 230-31 (emphasizing that a commander is required to begin separation processing when the commander has found the servicemember violated 10 U.S.C. § 654).
See supra Parts IV.D. and V.B.
United States v. Hudson, 59 MJ. 357, 358 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 359 (quoting United States v. Lloyd, 46 MJ. 19,23 (C.A.A.F. 1997)).
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tive, that is, factually the same. The test to determine
whether an offense is factually the same as another offense,
and therefore lesser-included to that offense, is the "elements" test. Under this test, the court considers whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not. Rather than adopting a literal application of the elements test, this Court [has] stated that resolution of lesserincluded claims can only be resolved by lining up elements
realistically and determining whether each element of the
supposed lesser offense is rationally derivative of one or
more elements of the other offense-and vice versa.
Whether an offense is a lesser-included offense is a matter of
law that this Court will consider de novo. 248

Post-Marcum, this test was employed by the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether adultery, consensual sodomy, and
fraternization convictions were multiplicious. 249 Ultimately, in that
case the court determined that the fraternization and consensual sodomy charges were not multiplicious, while the adultery and fraternization were. 250 Interestingly, the court was persuaded by the factual
distinction of "sexual intercourse" versus "fellatio" when it determined
that the fraternization and sodomy charges were "factually
distinguishable. "251
This ruling creates an interesting legal twiSt. 252 If, on the one hand,
a servicemember is involved in an unauthorized relationship and engages in sexual intercourse and sodomy, the servicemember can be
charged with both fraternization and sodomy, without the charges being multiplicious. 253 If, however, on the other hand, this same servicemember only goes so far as to engage in sodomy within the
unauthorized relationship, the fraternization and sodomy charges
would be multiplicious because they would both be based upon sodomy, and thus "factually the same."254
248. United States v. Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *7-8 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
March 30, 2005) (quoting Hudson, 59 MJ. at 359 (citations omitted)) (emphasis added by lower court).
249. [d. at *2, *7-8.
250. [d. at *13 (finding the adultery and fraternization were both based on the
same factual act of "sexual intercourse").
251. [d.
252. Gamez., 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13.
253. [d.
254. [d. at *8, *13; see also text accompanying supra note 251. If the Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals found the fraternization and adultery convinctions multiplicious because they were both based on the act of "sexual intercourse," it follows that fraternization and sodomy would have to be
multiplicious as well when both are based on the same act, i.e., sodomy.
Gamez, 2005 CCA LEXIS 109, at *13. It seems a military prosecutor could
avoid the multiplicity question by simply basing the fraternization charge
on anything but sodomy.
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In cases like Gamez, however, where the fraternization and sodomy
are based on different sex acts, one could argue that the subtle distinction between varying sex acts is meaningless because of Marcum's
new requirements. 255 The Marcum holding, in essence, states the crucial fact now required to uphold consensual sodomy charges is the
unauthorized relationship in conjunction with the sodomy.256 Thus, to
be constitutional in the military environment, a consensual sodomy
charge now requires an unauthorized relationship-based nexus, such
as adultery or fraternization, making the relationship itself a key fact
of the sodomy charge. 257 Therefore the consensual sodomy offense
and the relationship-based offense, regardless of any differences in
the underlying sex acts, would be necessarily "factually the same,"258
and thus, charging both would be multiplicious.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The newly created Marcum Test is constitutional and, for most servicemembers, expands their right to engage in private sexual conduct. 259 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' rulings in
Marcum and Stirewalt imply that the nature of the relationship between
two people will form the basis for determining whether their conduct
falls under the Lawrence protections. 26o Appellate courts will uphold
consensual sodomy convictions when the underlying relationship is
unauthorized, while the converse will be true as well. 261
The implication this may have on homosexual conduct has yet to be
seen. 262 If the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces continues to
follow this relationship-based path, then it would seem consensual homosexual sodomy would be proscribed and within the government's
right to prosecute. 263
Military prosecutors, however, have at their disposal a number of
other punitive and administrative articles of the UCMJ with which to
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C.
United States v. Gamez, 2005 eCA LEXIS 109, at *8, *13 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. March 30, 2005) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 59 MJ. 357,359
(CA.A.F.2004)).
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Parts IV.E-F.
See supra Parts IV.E-F., notes 224-25, and accompanying text.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C. The military's homosexual policy is being challenged in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See Complaint at 24, Cook v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-12546 GAO (D. Mass. Dec. 6,
2004), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf
_file/ 1864. pdf; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, 3, Cook v. Rumsfeld, Civil Action No. 04-12546 GAO
(D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/
SLDN_ARTICLES/pdCfile/1869.pdf.
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punish those who violate military relationship regulations. 264 To survive the Marcum Test, these relationship convictions would be a prerequisite to any consensual sodomy conviction. 265 Therefore, simply
adding a consensual sodomy charge to the relationship charge may be
multiplicious and, regardless, not necessary within the military environment to punish the servicemember(s) involved. 266
Captain Erik C. Coynet

264. See supra Part VI.A.
265. See supra Part V.C.
266. See supra Part VI.B. See also John Files, Pentagon Considers Changing the Legal
Definition of Sodomy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at A17. This article discusses
a memorandum sent from the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to Congress calling for the end of the military's proscription
of consensual sodomy. [d. The memorandum calls for a change in the law
to only outlaw sodomy "with a person under age 16 or acts 'committed by
force. ", [d.
t J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law; M.A., Bowie
State University, 2001; B.S., The United States Air Force Academy, 1996.
The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

